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When IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law was founded 125 years ago, 
many of our key legal institutions, 
such as the jury, were well estab-
lished. By 1888, the year of our 
school’s founding, the jury was seen 
as an institution that provided jus-
tice in a nation created by a revo-
lution of “we the people.” Although 
it no longer seems remarkable to us 
today, the jury system gave ordinary 
citizens, untutored in the law, the 
power to decide cases and to dis-
pense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies, 
television shows, and constant me-
dia coverage, the American people 
have two deeply-held views about 
the jury. The first is that the jury is 
meant to represent all of us—“we 
the people”—by reflecting our di-
versity as much as is practical. In 
every high-profile jury case, much 
attention is paid to the diversity of 
the jury. In particular, we care about 
race and gender more than almost 
any other characteristics. Although 
the diversity of the venire is en-
shrined in several Supreme Court 
cases, the diversity of the petit jury 
is reinforced by the portrayal of the 
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is 
that the jury has one job, and that is 
to determine the facts. Although a 
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“First woman jury, Los Angeles,” photo by Bain News Service, 1911, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.
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jury trial is presided over by a judge 
and involves decision-making about 
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no 
role in determining which laws ap-
ply or what standards should be met. 
This arrangement seems sensible be-
cause the judge and lawyers bring to 
the trial legal expertise that the ju-
rors do not have.
While these two views are well 
accepted, the students in our first 
law class in 1888 would be shocked 
to learn what our first-year students 
now take for granted. Though our 
modern impulse is to assume that 
a jury should reflect the diversity 
of our community, at one time that 
diversity was limited to white men 
of property. Our broader under-
standing of diversity has been the 
result of a hard-fought struggle to 
extend the rights of jury service to 
African-American men and later 
to women. This expansion of jury 
rights, however, has not been contin-
uous; rather, it has proceeded in fits 
and starts. In fact, African-Ameri-
can men in some states in the South 
were given the right to serve as jurors 
during Reconstruction only to have 
that right stripped away by the end 
of the 1800s before being restored 
decades later. So, too, with women 
in the Western territories; they had 
the right to serve as jurors in the late 
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern 
reader to discover that the role of the 
jury was initially to decide both the 
law and the facts. The diminution of 
the role of the jury, so that it decided 
only the facts, happened gradually 
from about 1850 to the 1930s. Some 
researchers believe that as the prac-
tice of law became more profession-
al, the distinction widened between 
judges and lawyers who knew the 
law and ordinary citizens who did 
not, until it made little sense for ju-
rors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in 
which I see a connection between 
the growing diversity of the jury and 
the declining power of the jury. My 
theory is that the white, male legal 
establishment began to curtail the 
power of the jury as African-Amer-
ican men and women had the right 
to serve on juries. Although Afri-
can-American men and women lost 
that right by the late 1800s, they re-
gained it, albeit after much struggle, 
many decades later. For both groups, 
however, even when official barriers 
were eliminated, other practices kept 
them from actually being seated on 
juries. Some of these practices, such 
as the peremptory challenge, are still 
used today in a discriminatory man-
ner, in spite of Supreme Court cases 
to the contrary, in an effort to keep 
African-American men and women 
from being seated on juries.
   
The Exclusion of African-American 
Men from the Jury
Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss, in an article entitled A 
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
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the United States, identified 1860 as 
the year in which African-American 
men first served on a jury. In that 
year, two African-American men sat 
on a jury in Worcester, Massachu-
setts. In 1864, Congress passed leg-
islation that allowed African-Amer-
ican men to testify in federal courts, 
and this was followed by legislation 
that allowed them to testify in state 
courts. Jury service was soon to fol-
low.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served 
on juries in some states. For example, 
in South Carolina in 1869, the leg-
islature mandated not only the in-
tegration of grand and petit juries, 
but also that the racial composition 
of the jury should approximate that 
of the community. Similarly, in New 
Orleans between 1872 and 1878, 
one-third of the citizens summoned 
for jury duty were African-Ameri-
cans, and this percentage matched 
their representation in Orleans 
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in 
Washington County, Texas, where 
African-Americans were approxi-
mately 50 percent of the population, 
they constituted about 30 percent of 
those who served on juries. During 
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mis-
sissippi, African-Americans were 
about 35 percent of the grand jurors, 
and even though that percentage did 
not approximate their percentage in 
the community (where they were 70 
percent of the community), it was a 
significant improvement over their 
total exclusion in the past.
Newspapers, in their reporting of 
jury trials during this period, noted 
when an African-American man 
(and they were only men) served as 
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story 
questioned whether South Carolina 
jurors in a particular case had vot-
ed to convict based on their political 
parties; it included the following ob-
servation: “Three of the jurors, one 
a negro and two white men, refused 
to find a verdict of guilty.” On Feb-
ruary 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, a story described a murder 
trial in New Orleans and mentioned 
the sole African-American juror on 
this jury: “The only juror who stood 
out from the very beginning in fa-
vor of conviction was one Edwards, 
a negro, and the only negro on the 
jury, and he maintained his manly 
and honest position to the end, not-
withstanding that [the defendant’s] 
friends went to his house while he 
was serving and threatened his fam-
ily with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also 
noted when the African-American 
juror was the first African-Amer-
ican to serve in that locale. A brief 
story on May 6, 1891, in the New 
York Times announced that a man 
named Nelson Stark, described as 
“colored,” had been selected as the 
eleventh juror in the Garrison mur-
der trial. The story noted that “[it] is 
the first time in the history of that 
county [in West Virginia] that a col-
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ored man has sat on an important 
case in the State court.” Similarly, 
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the 
first time in the history of Kentucky 
the panel of jurymen for the duty 
in a criminal court included in the 
list of the Louisville Circuit Court 
to-day three colored men.” Two of 
those men were selected to serve on 
a grand jury and the third man was 
selected for a petit jury. The article 
noted that there were a number of 
African-Americans at court that day 
and “they evidently took great satis-
faction in seeing representatives of 
their race assume privileges hereto-
fore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-Ameri-
can men on the jury was not limited 
to Southern states. A notice in the 
New York Times on November 19, 
1890, announced that “[a]mong the 
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court 
this morning was Abe Peterson, a 
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first 
colored man to sit on a jury in Rens-
salaer County[, New York].” On July 
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chi-
cago Daily Tribune reported that for 
the first time in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, an all-African-American jury 
(six jurors) heard a civil case involv-
ing an assault and battery; the arti-
cle noted that this jury marked “an 
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury tri-
als also reported on perceived dif-
ferences between white jurors and 
African-American jurors. Accord-
ing to one story in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first 
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day, 
promptly joined in convicting a ne-
gro who was put on trial.” As a result 
of African-Americans’ seeming pro-
clivity to convict, “[t]he next prison-
er, also a negro, objected to having 
one of his own race on the jury.” 
Another story, published in the New 
York Times on November 3, 1885, 
also observed that African-Amer-
ican jurors had been “decidedly 
in favor of the Commonwealth as 
against colored offenders.” The arti-
cle suggested that African-American 
jurors wanted to show that they were 
committed to law and order—so 
much so that older lawyers who had 
African-American clients would not 
“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.
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select African-American jurors be-
cause “they claim[ed] that colored 
jurors are more severe in meting 
out punishment to offenders of their 
race.”
In spite of constitutional protec-
tions provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth 
Amendment (1870), statutory protec-
tions provided by the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871, the Federal Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, and the Federal Jury 
Selection Act 
of 1879, and a 
U.S. Supreme 
Court case, 
Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 
(1880), which 
held that a state 
statute dis-
qualifying African-American men 
from jury service was unconstitu-
tional, African-American men lost 
their place on juries in the South 
in the 1890s. Booker T. Wash-
ington observed at the end of the 
nineteenth century: “In the whole 
of Georgia & Alabama, and other 
Southern states not a negro juror is 
allowed to sit in the jury box in state 
courts.” According to a 1910 study, 
African-Americans rarely served on 
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, and they never served on 
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In 
sum, according to another commen-
tator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough 
it was common for blacks to have 
served as jurors during Reconstruc-
tion, they virtually disappeared from 
the southern jury box by 1900, even 
in counties where they constituted 
an overwhelming majority of the lo-
cal population.”
Even though statutes could no 
longer prohibit African-American 
men from serving on the jury after 
Strauder, other 
practices kept 
them from the 
jury box. James 
Forman, in Ju-
ries and Race 
in the Nine-
teenth Century, 
described the 
violence di-
rected toward African-Americans 
and white Republicans that kept 
African-American men in the South 
from serving as jurors or witnesses, 
or seeking or being afforded the pro-
tection of the legal system. All-white 
Southern juries failed to convict the 
white perpetrators of these crimes.  
Non-violent and more subtle 
practices also kept African-Amer-
icans from actually being seated on 
a jury, even if they had been sum-
moned to serve. These practices 
ranged from color-coding by race 
the names placed in the wheel from 
which jurors were selected to the 
discretion exercised by white jury 
commissioners in selecting only 
“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E. 
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.
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white men whom they knew to serve 
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law, 
which allowed three state officials to 
select jurors based on their “good in-
telligence, sound judgment, and fair 
character,” was another way to keep 
African-Americans off the jury; oth-
er Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory 
peremptory challenges, which con-
tinues to this day, was another way 
to keep African-Americans from 
being selected for petit juries. Each 
party could exercise a certain num-
ber of peremptories and use them 
to remove prospective jurors with-
out giving any reason at all. Parties 
used their peremptory challenges to 
remove African-Americans from the 
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exer-
cised race-based peremptories to re-
move African-Americans from the 
jury in criminal cases in which the 
defendant was African-American. 
Even after a number of cases, from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in 
which the Supreme Court developed 
an elaborate framework to attempt 
to counter the exercise of race-based 
peremptory challenges, the practice 
continues today. Lawyers have sim-
ply learned ways to avoid discovery. 
In some courts in the South, defense 
lawyers in capital cases will not even 
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a 
race-based peremptory because they 
know the judge will never find a pe-
remptory to be discriminatory. The 
practice of exercising discriminatory 
peremptory challenges persists, even 
though it is undertaken in more sub-
tle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury
Women’s experience in serv-ing as jurors tracked Afri-
can-American men’s experience in 
some ways, but lagged behind by 
many years. Before 1888, women in 
at least two Western territories were 
permitted to serve as jurors, and in 
1898 women in Utah were permitted 
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Territo-
ry gave women the right to vote and 
to sit on juries in 1869, with the first 
woman sitting on a jury in Laramie, 
Wyoming in 1871. However, there is 
some dispute as to when Wyoming 
women lost their right to sit on ju-
ries. Albert Alschuler and Andrew 
Deiss point to 1872 as the year that 
“Wyoming’s experiment in equality 
in the courtroom” came to an end, 
and a New York Times article on No-
vember 19, 1883, claimed that “no 
woman [in Wyoming] is ever seen 
nowadays in the jury box.” Howev-
er, in an article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune on October 26, 1891, the 
first Governor of the State of Wyo-
ming was interviewed and said that 
there had been “several women ju-
rors in the courts of Cheyenne, the 
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming 
Almanac of Politics included an arti-
cle from the Cheyenne Daily Leader, 
dated September 17, 1891, describ-
ing a trial in which the defendant 
was female as were two of the jurors. 
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In 1884, women in Washington Ter-
ritory had the right to vote and to 
serve on juries. However, in 1887, 
after a change in personnel on the 
Supreme Court of Washington Terri-
tory, women lost their right to sit on 
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women 
to serve as jurors, and has tradition-
ally been credited as the first state to 
do so, though women rarely served 
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few wom-
en serving as jurors in the 1880s, 
there were occasional ruminations 
about what women jurors would be 
like and what difference they would 
make on juries. In a brief note in 
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April 
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine 
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is 
difficult to convict a female defen-
dant on the West Coast, and perhaps 
if women were permitted to serve as 
jurors this situation would change. 
The writer offered the following rec-
ommendation: “It would be a good 
thing if the rights of women could 
be so extended that in cases where 
a woman is accused of crime she 
might be tried by a jury of her own 
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a 
brief article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors, 
which raised the question wheth-
er Lizzie Borden should have been 
tried by a jury that included women 
because “a woman on trial for her 
life should have the right to demand 
an equal representation of women 
on the jury.” However, the same ar-
ticle also suggested that whenever 
the defendant is a woman, “there 
are few men not predisposed to re-
gard the opposite sex with tender 
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
to consider a bill that would allow 
women to serve as jurors if they “are 
wives of men who are duly qualified 
so to act,” according to an article in 
the New York Times on February 1, 
1893. The article reported that Dr. 
Mary Walker spoke in support of the 
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920, which gave them the right to 
vote, would also give them the right 
to serve on juries, but this proved 
not to be the case in most states. Ac-
cording to Professor Gretchen Ritter, 
around the time of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, 14 states granted wom-
en the right to serve on the jury. In 
seven of these states, new laws were 
passed that gave women the right to 
serve. In the other seven states, ju-
ry-qualification statutes described 
jurors as “electors,” so once women 
became electors under the Nine-
teenth Amendment, they automat-
ically became eligible to serve as 
jurors. However, other states, like 
Illinois, rejected this idea. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court reasoned that 
at the time when the Illinois General 
Assembly used the term “electors” 
only men could be electors. If wom-
en were to be included as “electors,” 
then it was up to the Illinois General 
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Assembly to say so, which it did, 
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow 
women to serve on juries in their 
own courts, and the federal courts 
followed the practice of the state in 
which the federal court was located. 
It was not until the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 that federal courts allowed 
women to serve as jurors in feder-
al courts regardless of the practice 
of that state’s courts. State courts, 
even when they ostensibly permitted 
women to serve as jurors, followed 
practices that kept many women 
from actually serving. In some states, 
women had automatic exemptions 
from jury duty. In other states, such 
as Florida and Louisiana, women 
could serve as jurors, but only if they 
went down to the courthouse and 
affirmatively registered for service, 
which was an extra step that men 
did not have to take. States that ad-
hered to this practice claimed that it 
respected women’s role in the home 
and that most women would be un-
able to serve because of their duties 
at home. The effect of affirmative 
registration was that very few wom-
en registered for jury service. As late 
as 1961, this practice was upheld in 
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), 
and was not found to be unconstitu-
tional until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affir-
mative registration, the exercise of 
peremptory challenges was another 
way to keep women from serving 
as jurors. Although women were 
summoned to serve, they could be 
struck from the petit jury by lawyers 
exercising gender-based peremptory 
challenges. Whereas race-based pe-
remptory challenges were addressed 
by the Supreme Court in a series of 
cases spanning from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases 
did not become applicable to gen-
der until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although 
there are many reasons that lawyers 
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over 
jury selection to ridding the jury 
of an outlier who could not be dis-
missed for cause—the peremptory 
challenge also should be seen as a 
practice that has been, and contin-
ues to be, used to keep women and 
African-Americans from serving on 
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power
Back in 1888, when Afri-can-American men had for all 
intents and purposes lost their right 
to serve on juries and the few wom-
en in Western territories still had 
their short-lived right to serve on 
juries, the jury had begun to experi-
ence a decline in power. Whereas the 
jury—from colonial times until the 
1850s—had always had the power to 
decide the law and the facts, the jury 
started to lose its power to decide 
the law and was reduced to deciding 
only the facts. This loss came about 
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through state court interpretations 
of state statutes and constitutions. 
This loss could be seen in a number 
of states, including Massachusetts 
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and 
soon spread to other states, includ-
ing Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in 
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana 
and Maryland, still instruct jurors 
that they have the right to determine 
the law as well as the facts. Although 
these two states’ constitutions pro-
vide for this right, the judiciary in 
both states has narrowed this right 
through case law.
My own theory is that as Afri-
can-American men and women 
sought to serve on juries, there was 
a move on the part of judges to limit 
the power of juries. Some commen-
tators suggest that this move came 
about because of the growing pro-
fessionalization of judges. As judg-
es received legal training and saw 
themselves as professionals, they 
began to see the functions of judges 
and juries as distinct, and attempt-
ed to limit juries to the fact-finding 
function only. Another possibility is 
that as the law grew more complex, it 
seemed appropriate for professionals 
with training and knowledge to de-
cide it, rather than citizens who had 
only common sense and experience 
to guide them. My own theory is that 
the move to limit the function of the 
jury to fact-finding came about at a 
time when outsiders—women and 
African-Americans—were trying to 
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-
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though African-American men and 
women had not yet been able to se-
cure their right to serve, the writing 
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time 
of transformation for the jury. Juries 
in many states had lost their power 
to decide the law, and were officially 
limited to finding the facts. It is no 
coincidence that this occurred at a 
time when African-American men 
and women had experienced the 
right to serve as jurors, albeit brief-
ly, and sought to recover that right, 
even though it would take them 
many years to do so. ◆
